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Lumber Company case be subsequently modified, we are justified
in concluding that this migration of authority is practically complete. Whatever else be the implications of this recent pronouncement of our highest tribunal, it has certainly met the criticism
that the American constitutional system is too inflexible to operate in an evolving world.
WM. T. PEGUES*
BEN B. TAYLOR, JR*

DIVISIBILITY OF THE MINERAL SERVITUDE
The development of the concept of the mineral servitude in
Louisiana has given rise to the application of many legal doctrines and rules. Of all of these, perhaps the most controversial is
the doctrine announced in Sample v. Whitaker that the mineral
servitude is indivisible. Some writers felt very strongly that this
doctrine of indivisibility ought not be applied to the mineral servitude,2 and consequently most of the argument has been concerned with this. However, any belief that the court would reverse itself was abandoned after a very recent decision, which
followed the doctrine to its logical extreme. With approval by the
court now clearly established, a re-examination and analysis of
the doctrine, and an inquiry as to how it should be applied, would
appear to be appropriate, for upon this doctrine rests a great deal
of the law of prescription as applied to the mineral servitude.
The first type of situation in which the doctrine of indivisibility occurs is that in which a mineral servitude created on a
particular tract of land is acquired by A and B as co-owners. Does
the interruption or suspension of prescription on the servitude as
to A also interrupt or suspend it as to B? To this the Louisiana
Supreme Court gave an affirmative answer in Sample v. Whitaker. In so doing the court rejected the contention of the landowner that Article 5381 of the Civil Code, which states that a
* Member of the Louisiana Bar.
1. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
2. See Comment (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 246.
3. Ohio Oil Co. v. Cox, 198 So. 902 (La. 1940).
4. Art. 538, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Usufruct is divisible; for if this right
is vested in several persons at a time, there is but one usufruct, which is
divided among them, each having his portion. The reason is because the
object of this right is the receiving the fruits of the thing, which are corporeal and divisbie."
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usufruct is divisible as between co-owners, should also be applied
to the mineral servitude. Instead the court adopted the rule applicable to predial servitudes contained in Article 656 that: "The
rights of servitudes, considered in themselves, are not susceptible
of division ....
5, The court next applied Article 8026 which, it
pointed out, was "the logical sequence of the principle that the
rights of servitude are indivisible. . . . ..
7 Since that time the
principle has been followed in many cases of this type. These
cases have been collected and analyzed very ably, 8 and require
no further treatment here.
The second type of case in which divisibility of the mineral
servitude becomes important is this: A purchases or reserves all
the mineral rights under a section of land, and then sells all his
mineral rights in the northern half of this section to B. In this
situation, will B's user of the servitude on the northern half interrupt prescription running against the southern half? It is submitted that it will not, since the servitude has been divided by
the sale from A to B. However, an almost total lack of pertinent
jurisprudence makes it difficult to predict what the supreme court
will hold when this point is presented.
In Arent v. Hunter9 a situation similar to the above was before the supreme court. In that case, A and B bought a block of
land in fee. They then granted to X Company a mineral lease on
five noncontiguous tracts thereof. Sometime later, in 1917, A and B
sold the entire block to C reserving all the minerals. In September, 1918, X Company drilled on one of the leased tracts and completed a well which it immediately capped. In 1923 A and B sold
to C all their mineral rights under the tracts of land not under
lease. In January, 1928, X Company reopened the capped well
5. Art. 656, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The rights of servitudes, considered
in themselves, are not susceptible of division, either real or imaginary. It Is
impossible that an estate should have upon another estate part of a right of
way, or of view, or any other right of servitude, and also that an estate be
charged with a part of a servitude.
"The use of a right of servitude may be limited to certain days or hours;
but thus limited, it is an entire right, and not part of a right.
"From thence it follows that a servitude existing in favor of a piece of
land, Is due to the whole of it, and to all the parts of it, so that if the land
be sold in parts, every purchaser of a part has the right of using the servitude in toto."
6. Art. 802, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If among the coproprietors there be
one against whom prescription can not run, as for instance a minor, he shall
preserve the right of all the others."
7. Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 729, 135 So. 38, 40 (1931).
8. Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana (1939) 24 et seq; Comment (1940)
14 Tulane L. Rev. 246.
9. 171 La. 1059, 137 So. 157 (1931).
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and started production. This suit was brought by C, more than
ten years after the original drilling in 1918, to have himself declared owner of the mineral rights under the entire block of land.
The court held that the reservation of all the minerals in 1917
created one servitude in A and B. When they sold to C the mineral rights on the tracts not subject to the lease, the servitude on
them became extinguished by confusion and five new servitudes
in favor of A and B were created on the five noncontiguous tracts
under lease. Hence, the production in 1928 interrupted prescription only as to the tract on which the well was located and the
mineral rights on the other four noncontiguous tracts were lost by
nonuser.
There can be no doubt that if A and B had not sold to C the
mineral rights on the tracts not covered by the lease, the production would have interrupted prescription as to the entire block of
land since there was then but one servitude. 10 Moreover, unless
the sale to C did divide the servitude rather than make C a coowner, it would not have been extinguished by confusion,11 as to
the part not under lease. Therefore, the writer concludes that this
case holds the mineral servitude to be divisible by surface area.
Is this in conflict with the doctrine of the Sample case-that
the rights of a mineral servitude are indivisible? A close examination of that case reveals that the court intended to convey only
the idea that as between co-owners the mineral servitude is indivisible. The unqualified use of the word "indivisible" by the court
to describe the mineral servitude is quite understandable in view
of the argument of counsel that a mineral right, being a personal
servitude, was divisible among co-owners under Article 538. Obviously the court was using indivisibility as opposed to divisibility
in that sense. This is further clarified by Article 656, upon which
the court relied. The article explains the concept of indivisibility
by pointing out that it is impossible to have upon an estate part
of a right of way, or of view. However, the "use of the right of
10. Levy v. Crawford, Jenkins & Booth, 194 La. 757, 194 So. 772 (1940).

Although the court in Arent v. Hunter referred to the leases as servitudes, a
practice to which Chief Justice O'Neill dissented specifically, it is clear that

they were in fact ordinary mineral leases as in the Levy case. It should be
particularly noticed that the court awarded the royalties from the lease to
Hunter and McCormick, the original grantees and holders of the single
mineral servitude preserved by the drilling of the well by the lessee.
11. Art. 805, La. Civil Code of 1870 states: "Every servitude is extinguished, when the estate to which it is due, and the estate owning it, are

united in the same hands.
"But it is necessary that the whole of the two estates should belong to
the same owner; for if the owner of one estate only acquires the other [in]
part or in common with another person, confusion does not take effect."
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servitude may be limited to certain days or hours; but thus limited, it is an entire right, and not part of a right.' 1 2 Here the use
of the mineral servitude was limited to certain areas; as thus
limited it was an entire right or servitude and not part of a right.
One objection to this theory has been made upon the ground
that all the original servitude owner obtains is a single servitude
and he therefore has no right to create additional ones at the
expense of the landowner. Such an objection might be tenable if
it could be shown that by so doing the servitude owner would
increase the burden on the land.18 As a matter of fact, the creation of additional servitudes, instead of increasing the burden,
actually decreases it. This was recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which stated that a division of the servitude would
"lessen the value of the servitude or ...make it less burdensome
to the servient estate. . . . "14 Moreover, any theoretical objection
can be answered by pointing out that although the servitude
owner creates additional servitudes, these are created out of the
rights of servitude granted to him in the original deed or reservation and do not go beyond the terms of that instrument."
This view of mineral servitude will explain the seeming
anomaly. in the two Sample v. Whitaker cases. 16 A single fact
situation gave rise to both suits. Sample sold to York Whitaker
two contiguous tracts of land and reserved all the mineral rights.
This, it can be observed, created a single servitude. Later York
sold one of the tracts to Isaac Whitaker, not mentioning the
reservation. In the suit against York Whitaker the court held that
ownership of a fraction of this servitude by a minor suspended
prescription liberandi causa as to all his co-owners, since the
servitude was indivisible. In the other suit the court held the
servitude to be extinguished as to the tract bought by Isaac
Whitaker because of the running of prescription acquirendi causa
in his favor. It cannot be denied that as a result of this holding
12. Art. 656, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. This idea is embodied in Art. 776, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. Connell v. Muslow Oil Co., 186 La. 491, 496, 172 So. 763, 765 (1937).
15. Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code (1925) 181, seems to indicate the
possibility of this in a negative way when he says:
"Persons having a qualified right in property cannot establish servitudes
extending beyond their rights-as, where usufructuary of an estate established a servitude on the estate of which he has the usufruct, the servitude
comes to an end when the usufruct terminates."
16. It was pointed out in Daggett, op. cit. supra note 8, at 80, that in
these cases in which the Supreme Court first expounded the indivisibility of
the mineral servitude it allowed that part of the servitude resting on Isaac
Whitaker's land to be extinguished and the other part to continue in existence.

19411

COMMENTS

there was a division of the mineral servitude. Nevertheless, there
was no division of the rights of the servitude or of the servitude
itself as between co-owners. 17 The rights of the servitude as to the
tract bought by Isaac were complete rights and these were extinguished. On the other hand, because the servitude was indivisible
as between co-owners, the minority of one co-owner suspended
prescription liberandi causa as to the entire rights of servitude on
the tract retained by York."8
The holding of the Arent case discussed above is clearly dis9
tinguishable from that of Connell v. Muslow Oil Company.1
In
the latter case the owner of land sold it and reserved all the mineral rights. Thereafter the purchaser sold a portion of the land to
a third person without mentioning the mineral servitude. For
some time prior thereto there had been a producing well on the
tract retained by the original purchaser. The third person claimed
that the servitude had been extinguished on the tract purchased
by him by prescription acquirendi causa. The court held that it
was not extinguished inasmuch as there was only one servitude
and it had been continually exercised. The third person thus was
never in possession of that right as had been Isaac Whitaker in
the Sample case. It was pointed out that the landowner after
divesting himself of the mineral servitude could not divide that
servitude by a superficial division of the estate. This is quite logical since the landowner who has alienated a servitude no longer
has any interest in it.
On the other hand, in the Arent case the division of the servitude was made by the servitude owner. In effect the servitude
owner also divided the servitude in the Sample case. The method
there was by allowing prescription acquirendi causa to run against
part of the land covered by the servitude. This was just as effective an alienation as if the servitude owner sold to another all
his mineral rights in that part of the land.
The third type of situation was presented in Clark v. Tensas
Delta Land Company.2 There the defendant bought one-half of
the mineral rights from the owner of a certain tract of land. Suit
was brought by the landowner's assignor more than ten years
after the date of that mineral deed. In answer to the plea of pre17. Compare the concepts of divisibility in Arts. 656, 776, 803, La. Civil
Code of 1870.
18. A very similar situation explainable in the same manner occurred in
Palmer Corporation of Louisiana v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1931).
19. 186 La. 491, 172 So. 763 (1937).
20. 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931). For another case where the same facts
were involved see Myers v. Cooke, 175 La. 30, 142 So. 790 (1932).
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scription liberandi causa, the defendant company argued that it
was a co-owner of the mineral rights with the landowner and
could not act without his consent; hence prescription should not
run against it. The court very properly pointed out that the defendant was not a co-owner but rather the full owner of a complete servitude and could exercise that servitude without the
permission of the landowner.2 1 A proper analysis 22 of this case
calls for an examination of the rights of mineral servitudes.
Certainly among the most valuable of these are the right to
search and explore for minerals and the right to reduce them to
possession. These are indivisible, and whoever owns a mineral
servitude owns a full right to explore for and to reduce to possession the minerals. The minerals reduced to possession are the advantages resulting from the servitude and hence are divisible. 2
Thus a landowner may create different mineral servitudes in several individuals each of whom would have a full and complete
right to explore for and reduce to possession the minerals on the
land. However, all these individuals ,would be under the common
obligation to distribute the advantages so obtained according to
24
the ownership thereof.
In the opinion the court pointed out that the defendant had
never attempted to exercise the mineral servitude and that the
mineral deed expressly stated that the defendant should have a
right to use the "land in any manner whatsoever in mining."
However, these factors appear to be but makeweight and should
not be regarded as detracting from the broadness of the decision.2 5 From the opinion it seems clear that if the defendant had
21. "What the Delta Land Company owned was not half of the right to
the minerals, but the right to half the minerals, in Clark's Land."
"The right which the Tensas Delta Land Company acquired from the
Kimball Lumber Manufacturing Company was a servitude on the latter's
land ... therefore the Kimball Lumber Manufacturing Company was obliged,
and so was each subsequent owner of the land subject to the servitude
obliged, to permit the Tensas Delta Land Company to go upon the land and
explore for oil, gas, and other minerals, and to reduce them to possession,
and account to the owner of the land for half of such oil, gas, or other
minerals." 172 La. 913, 915-916, 136 So. 1, 2 (1931).
22. For an exhaustive analysis of this case see Daggett, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 82 et seq.
23. Art. 657, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Though the right of servitude be
indivisible, and must be established for the whole, and not for a part, nothing prevents the advantage resulting from it from being divided, if it be
susceptible of division; as, for example, the right of taking a certain number
of loads of earth from the land of another, or of sending to pasture a certain
number of animals on the land of another."
24. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 916, 136 So. 1, 2 (1931).
25. However, the court seemed to place a great deal of stress on the
failure to try to exercise the servitude in Myers v. Cooke, 175 La. 30, 142 So.
'790 (1932).
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been found to be a co-owner of the servitude, prescription could
not have run against him under the doctrine that as between coowners the mineral rights are indivisible and their mutual consent is necessary in order to exercise them.26
In conclusion, the foregoing may be restated as follows: As
between co-owners of a mineral servitude, that servitude is indivisible. This is merely another way of saying that the rights of
servitudes are indivisible under Article 656 of the Civil Code.
However, the servitude itself may be divided by designating the
superficial area to which the rights alienated are to apply. This
act creates another servitude out of the original one granted. The
sale by the landowner of a fractional part of the minerals creates
an entire and distinct servitude carrying with it all the rights
necessary for its exercise, and also the obligation of distributing
to the other owners of mineral rights their just proportion of the
minerals.
WILLIAM M.

SHAW

JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF THE ACTION OF
NULLITY IN LOUISIANA
Articles 604 to 608 inclusive of the Code of Practice of 1870
contain the provisions of our law relative to the annulment of
judgments. The causes for which the nullity of a judgment may
be demanded fall into two classes-vices in the form of proceeding and vices which go to the merits of the case.1
The vices of form which render a judgment null are listed in
Article 606 of the Code of Practice:
"1. If a judgment has been rendered, even contradictorily,
against a person disqualified by law from appearing in a suit,
as a minor without the assistance of his curator or tutor ....2
"2. If the defendant, although qualified to appear in a cause,
have been condemned by default, without having been cited;
"3. When the judgment, though clothed with all the necessary formalities, has, nevertheless, been given by a judge in26. Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 229, 82 So. 227 (1919); Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne, 148 La. 340, 86 So. 891 (1921).
1. Art. 605, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
2. The last clause of this subdivision, which reads "or a married woman
without the authorization of her husband or of the court" has been rendered.
obsolete by La. Act 283 of 1928.

